Microsoft the leader marketeer of operating systems is loosing it’s strength in Global Village. New operating systems which are very good when comparing to its technology. But the operating systems war doesnt finished yet. And I think the winner will be the one entegrate itself to a processing nit. Simply CPU.

MICROSOFT Windows has put on a lot of weight over the years.

Beginning as a thin veneer for older software code, it has become an obese monolith built on an ancient frame. Adding features, plugging security holes, fixing bugs, fixing the fixes that never worked properly, all while maintaining compatibility with older software and hardware — is there anything Windows doesn’t try to do?

Painfully visible are the inherent design deficiencies of a foundation that was never intended to support such weight. Windows seems to move an inch for every time that Mac OS X or Linux laps it.

The best solution to the multiple woes of Windows is starting over. Completely. Now.

Vista is the equivalent, at a minimum, of Windows version 12 — preceded by 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 3.1, NT, 95, NT 4.0, 98, 2000, ME, XP. After six years of development, the longest interval between versions in the previous 22-year history of Windows, and long enough to permit Apple to bring out three new versions of Mac OS X, Vista was introduced to consumers in January 2007.

When I.T. professionals and consumers got a look at Vista, they all had this same question for Microsoft: That’s it?

Just after Vista’s birth, Kevin Kutz, a manager at Microsoft, issued a cranky statement in February 2007, “In Response to Speculation on Next Version of Windows,” announcing that the company could not say anything about post-Vista Windows “other than that we’re working on it.”

The internal code name for the next version is “Windows 7.” The “7” refers to nothing in particular, a company spokeswoman says. This version is supposed to arrive in or around early 2010.

Will it be a top-to-bottom rewrite? Last week, Bill Veghte, a Microsoft senior vice president, sent a letter to customers reassuring them there would be minimal changes to Windows’ essential code. “Our approach with Windows 7,” he wrote, “is to build off the same core architecture as Windows Vista so the investments you and our partners have made in Windows Vista will continue to pay off with Windows 7.”

But sticking with that same core architecture is the problem, not the solution. In April, Michael A. Silver and Neil MacDonald, analysts at Gartner, the research firm, presented a talk titled “Windows Is Collapsing.” Their argument isn’t that Windows will cease to function but that the accumulated complexity, as Microsoft tries to support 20 years of legacies, prevents timely delivery of advances. “The situation is untenable,” their joint presentation says. “Windows must change radically.”

Some software engineers within Microsoft seem to be in full agreement, talking in public of work that began in 2003 to design a new operating system from scratch. They believe that problems like security vulnerabilities and system crashes can be fixed only by abandoning system design orthodoxy, formed in the 1960s and ’70s, that was built into Windows.

Unfortunately, this willingness to begin with an entirely new foundation is not located within the Windows group but in Microsoft’s research arm, where scientists and their heretical thoughts are safely isolated. Last April, Microsoft publicly unveiled the five-year-old research project, called “Singularity.” It is nothing more than a neat academic exercise, not a glimpse of Windows 7.

“Singularity is not the next Windows,” said Rich Rashid, the company’s senior vice president overseeing research. “Think of it like a concept car.”

If Microsoft thinks it is too late to actually use Singularity or something like it, the company should take heart from Apple’s willingness to brave the wrath of its users when, in 2001, it introduced Mac OS X. It was based on a modern microkernel design, which runs a very small set of essential services that make the system less vulnerable to crashes. But the change forced Mac users to buy new versions of all their existing Mac applications if they were to run speedily on the new system. It has paid off in countless ways, though, including some that could never have been anticipated at the time: just pick up an iPhone, built with the same code base.

Apple did not have to build a microkernel from scratch. It relied on more than a decade of development work performed by engineers at Next Computer, Steve Jobs’s start-up of the late 1980s and early ’90s. The engineers at Next, in turn, drew upon microkernel research by computer scientists at Carnegie-Mellon University.

In some crucial ways, however, Microsoft would enjoy advantages in developing its own “Windows OS X,” as we might call it, that Apple did not: the power of today’s quad-core machines and sophisticated virtualization software would allow older software applications and hardware peripherals to be used indefinitely with little or no performance penalty, making a clean start far easier for customers to accept.

A MONOLITHIC operating system like Windows perpetuates an obsolete design. We don’t need to load up our machines with bloated layers we won’t use. We need what Mr. Silver and Mr. MacDonald speak of as a “just enough” operating system. Additional functionality, appropriate to a given task, can be loaded as needed.

Microsoft should not wait to begin work on the big switch; it will take many, many years to prepare. Apple had the helpful goad of desperation. Avadis Tevanian, who worked on microkernel research as a Ph.D. student at Carnegie-Mellon, then on the Next operating system, followed by nine years at Apple where he oversaw the transition to Mac OS X, recalled how the decision was made when Apple’s market share was stuck at 3 percent and the company was losing money. I asked Mr. Tevanian if he thought Microsoft could pull off a similar switch.

“Perhaps, but I don’t know if it has the intestinal fortitude,” he said, “At Apple, we had to. It was a matter of survival.”

Microsoft should move its researchers into the heart of its systems development team. Windows OS X, a just-enough operating system built from scratch, is a product likely to be crucial to its future, too.

Randall Stross is an author based in Silicon Valley and a professor of business at San Jose State University. E-mail: stross@nytimes.com.

If you know anything about Microsoft history, you can easily see that, the battle between Microsoft and Google is just begin. Google, last week, agreed with yahoo about web-ads. That is probably people thinking is the end of the Microsoft absolutely wrong. Microsoft has a battle between, Netscape, ICQ, linux, which makes Microsoft stronger. In all these cases Microsoft wins the battle with absolutely the same way. Take the battle from technology to economy, which is their profesionality. As I said to Bill Gates on his last visit to Turkey, in my point of view Microsoft is not a technology company. They are a marketing company. They don’t produce technology, but selling technology. If Google try to fight with Microsoft in the market. They will probably lose the fight…

As Microsoft Walks Away, Yahoo Enters Google Ad Pact

Microsoft Corp. abandoned its pursuit of Yahoo Inc., opening the way for Yahoo to complete a search-advertising pact with rival Google Inc. that pits the industry’s two biggest forces against Microsoft.
Yahoo says talks with Microsoft are off, and it’s also not interested in selling parts of its business to the software giant. This means Yahoo’s future probably isn’t heading in the direction most investors would like. John Letzing reports.

Microsoft told Yahoo that it was no longer interested in pursuing a takeover, even at the $33 a share it offered for the Internet company last month. That price would have valued Yahoo at nearly $50 billion.

Microsoft also unsuccessfully floated an alternative proposal to acquire Yahoo’s search business for about $1 billion, a person familiar with Microsoft said. As part of that deal, Microsoft said it was prepared to acquire an additional 16% of Yahoo for $35 a share, or about $7.73 billion, according to people familiar with the situation.

Yahoo said Thursday that under the new Google pact, it will display some ads sold by its rival in a deal Yahoo estimated would generate $800 million in annual revenue through improved monetization of certain types of searches. Both companies said they were looking at ways to expand the limited partnership, possibly into display advertising.

Yahoo will control how Google’s ads are displayed alongside its own advertising. The pact is sure to face regulatory scrutiny. The companies agreed to delay its implementation for as many as three and a half months to allow regulatory review. In an interview, Yahoo President Susan Decker described the deal as “a bridge” that will help the company build up a converged display and search business.

The agreement seemed to leave room for Yahoo to pursue another deal, including a sale to Microsoft. Yahoo said either party can end the agreement in the event of a change in control. If that happens in the next 24 months, Yahoo would have to pay a termination fee of $250 million, minus some of the revenue Google had earned through the deal.

Yahoo said Friday that Google may terminate the agreement if it can’t generate a certain minimum revenue amount. In a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the company said Google can terminate the agreement if after 10 months — and each month after that — the gross revenue recognized by Google is less than $83.33 million for the four prior calendar months.

The Google-Yahoo collaboration is likely to get a hard look by regulators in both the U.S. and Europe. Sen. Herb Kohl (D-Wisc.), chairman of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, said the deal “raises important competition concerns” and promised a close examination.

“The consequences for advertisers and consumers could be far-reaching and warrant careful review, and we plan to investigate the competitive and privacy implications of this deal further in the Antitrust Subcommittee,” Sen. Kohl said in a statement.

The latest moves portend a period of deep uncertainty for the Internet sector, as the biggest players look for strategic footing against Google and smaller upstarts. Yahoo’s future also remains unclear. It must prove to impatient investors and employees that its independent strategy can work while competition heats up.

In retrospect, Microsoft’s tactics appear to have badly backfired. Instead of winning Yahoo’s huge audience and online search capabilities, Microsoft has driven its quarry into the arms of its archenemy — Google.

Yahoo resisted Microsoft from the beginning. Microsoft later raised its bid from $31 a share to $33. When Yahoo demanded even more, Microsoft said it was walking away.

A few weeks later, Microsoft re-emerged, saying it was willing to discuss an alternative transaction with Yahoo that wouldn’t involve a full takeover. But it also said it wasn’t ruling out pursuing a full-scale deal. That gave Yahoo investors hope that a deal was possible.

Chief among those hoping for a deal was investor Carl Icahn. Mr. Icahn said Thursday that he was studying the situation but otherwise declined to comment.

The negotiations between the two companies unraveled June 8 during a meeting at a private airport in San Jose, Calif. The Yahoo contingent included Chief Executive Jerry Yang and Chairman Roy Bostock. Microsoft’s team was led by Chief Executive Steve Ballmer.

At the meeting, Microsoft made it clear it no longer wanted to pursue a larger deal, the people familiar with the matter said. The Yahoo camp wasn’t interested in the smaller deal.

Two days later, Yahoo’s board met to evaluate its options and decided to pursue a deal with Google. Thursday, Mr. Yang notified Microsoft of Yahoo’s decision. Yahoo and Google signed the new deal.